Fireworks widow
to collect $1.35 million
-- The Supreme Court ruled that a Central Ohio widow can collect the $1.35
million settlement she agreed to accept for her husband's death in a fireworks accident
nearly six years ago. The man died after being hit by shrapnel as he watched a
July 4 display with his family in Reynoldsburg's Huber Park. His wife filed a
wrongful death suit against the city, also naming Truro Township - which inspected the
site beforehand - as a defendant
Both defendants filed motions for
summary judgment claiming sovereign immunity. A motion for summary judgment
asks the court to rule without a trial. The request is based on the assertion that
party who filed the motion should win the case "as a matter of law," or because
the evidence is legally insufficient to support a verdict in favor of the other party.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity
basically says that the government cannot be sued for negligence. Ohio statutes extend the
protection to political subdivisions with few exceptions.
While their motions for summary
judgments were pending, the city of Reynoldsburg and Truro Township reached a settlement
agreement. Reynoldsburg agreed to pay her $750,000 and Truro Township agreed to pay her
$600,000 if the motions failed. The trial court later denied both motions.
The city and township appealed, and the 10th
District Court of Appeals reversed the common pleas court and granted summary judgments.
The appeals court held that Reynoldsburg was immune from the suit and that Truro Township
was not liable because it did not have administrative jurisdiction over Huber Park.
The Supreme Court reversed the appeals court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Paul E. Pfeifer explained that sponsoring a fireworks
display is not a governmental function that would automatically entitle Reynoldsburg to
immunity under the law. Furthermore, the city could be held liable for Ryll's death if it
were determined that the city acted negligently. "There is evidence in the record
that Reynoldsburg designated a [spectator] area closer to the discharge area than called
for by [National Fire Protection Association] standards
We conclude there are factual
issues that cannot be resolved as a matter of law. Therefore, summary judgment cannot be
proper," Justice Pfeifer wrote.
Furthermore, he explained, summary judgment in favor
of Truro Township was inappropriate "because Huber Park is not as a matter of law
[outside] Truro Township."
"Our reading of the record reveals that
Reynoldsburg residents vote for Truro Township trustees and that a former
trustee
believes Huber Park to be located within Truro Township. Further, [we believe] that
ownership of the park is not relevant."
"The record reveals that Truro Township
inspected the premises prior to installation [of the fireworks]. Satisfying this statutory
requirement does not necessarily relieve Truro Township from liability for" failure
to keep Huber Park free from nuisance, Pfeifer wrote.
"Truro Township knew there was going to be a
fireworks display and knew that fireworks displays are potentially lethal. Nothing in the
record indicates that Truro Township attempted to determine whether the safety rules
required by [statute] were followed."
"We cannot say as a matter of law that Truro
Township kept Huber Park free from nuisance. Therefore, summary judgment cannot be proper
with respect to nuisance," Pfeifer wrote.
Justice Andrew Douglas wrote a separate concurring
opinion asserting that political subdivisions are not entitled to the immunity from
liability.
"I believe it to be a proper conclusion that a
political subdivision is not entitled to immunity based upon the right to remedy provision
of the first sentence of Section 16, Article I [of the Ohio Constitution]," Justice
Douglas wrote.
"Additionally, I believe that [Ohio's political
subdivision immunity law] violates the right to trial by jury provided for by Section 5,
Article I [of the] Ohio Constitution," Justice Douglas wrote.
Justice Deborah Cook wrote in a dissenting opinion
that the Supreme Court's consideration of the case was improper because orders denying
motions for summary judgment cannot be appealed. The case should have been remanded to the
trial court, she said.
"Because there was never a final appealable
order rendered by the trial court in this case, this court is without jurisdiction to
decide the merits of the cause."
Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justice Evelyn
Lundberg Stratton joined Justice Cook's decision.